Israel's Societies & The Societal Security Dilemma by Drijvers, A.J.
  
 
 
 
 
Israel’s Societies & The Societal Security Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.J. Drijvers 
Studentnumber: 0828912 
a.j.drijvers@umail.leidenuniv.nl 
Master International Studies Final Thesis 
Supervisor: Dr. C.A. Ennis 
Second Reader: Dr. M. Warnaar 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
 
2. A Review of the Societal Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5  
 
3. A Short History and Overview of the Composition of Israel’s Population . . . . . 10 
 
4. The Israeli State and Majority Societal Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 
 
5. The Vision Documents and Minority Societal Security Requirements . . . . . . . . 17  
 
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24  
 
7. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most prominent political conflicts of our time. 
Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just a political conflict over territory but has 
turned into an ethnic struggle between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people.
1
 A 
complicating factor in the conflict is that the Palestinian people have been scattered 
throughout the world due to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Some, however, 
remained and received Israeli citizenship. Today these Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel
2
 
comprise a group of over 1.7 million people out of Israel’s 8.3 million citizens.3 It has been 
well documented that the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel do not enjoy equal rights to those 
of their Jewish-Israeli counterparts and are considered to be second class citizens by the 
Israeli state
4
 or, as is the case in Shafir and Peled’s work, even considered as third class 
citizens.
5
 Although there has been considerable attention for Israel’s Arab citizens in 
academia in recent years most of the scholarly research with regard to the Arab citizens of 
Israel has been done within the framework of Israel as an ethnic democracy.
6
 The popular 
notion that Israel is an apartheid state has also found widespread resonance in academia.
7
 
The basic assumption in this thesis is that the societal security dilemma holds an 
alternative and valuable approach to understanding the relationship between the Arab and 
Jewish citizens of Israel and the dynamics of unequal citizenship. Societal security dilemmas 
are “security dilemmas that operate between societies, and thus have identity concerns as their 
                                                          
1
 For Example See: Menachem Klein. The Shift: Israel-Palestine From Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict. (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 2010). 
2
 In this thesis the Arab citizens of the state of Israel are frequently referred to as Palestinian-Arab citizens of 
Israel because this is how the Arab minority has identified itself in the Vision Documents. 
3
 Central Bureau of Statistics Official Website. “67th Independence Day - 8.3 Million Residents in the State of 
Israel.” On: www.cbs.gov.il. Last Accessed July 8, 2015.  
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201511099  
4
 See: International Crisis Group. “Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab Citizens.” Middle East Report N°25. March 
4, 2004. On: www.crisisgroup.org. Last Accessed July 8, 2015. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/reports.aspx?year=2004&page=7  
5
 See Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled. Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 110-136 
6
 For Example See: Sammy Smooha. “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype.” Israel Studies. 1997. Volume 
2(2): 198-241. 
7
 For Example See: 
- Rumy Hassan. “The Unitary, Democratic State and the Struggle Against Apartheid in Palestine-Israel.” 
Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal. 2008. Vol.7(1): 81-94.  
- Uri Davis. Israel: An Apartheid State. (London: Zed Books, 1987) 
- Uri Davis. Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within. (London, Zed Books, 2003) 
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central dynamic.”8 The main research question of this thesis is whether a societal security 
dilemma can be identified within the state of Israel between the Jewish-Israeli society and the 
Palestinian Arab society in Israel and if so, what kind of security dilemma. This will help to 
determine whether there are in fact legitimate societal security concerns at play between the 
two societies causing their complicated and unequal relationship or whether so-called power-
seeking is a more appropriate explanation. 
Like the traditional interstate security dilemma the societal security dilemma also 
consists of an action-reaction process geared towards fulfilling security requirements. Within 
the societal security dilemma, however, political-legal means are considered to be the tangible 
markers that signify negation or fulfillment of societal security requirements. Political-legal 
means can thus be studied in order to measure what threats are being perceived and how these 
are mitigated.
9
 In this thesis the action-reaction process from the side of the Jewish majority 
in Israel will be traced through the qualitative analyses of a relevant selection of political-
legal measures taken by the Israeli government with regard to Israel’s Palestinian Arab 
citizens. This selection of political-legal measures covers a time period from 1948 until today 
because most of the measures still have an effect on the Arab minority today even though 
some of them were already implemented in the 1950s. From the side of the Palestinian Arab 
minority in Israel the so-called Vision Documents
10
 will be qualitatively analyzed as part of 
the action-reaction process. This is due to the fact that the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel 
on the one side have limited political influence within the Israeli state and are thus not able to 
implement political-legal measures and on the other side because Arab society within Israel 
only fully politically emerged at the end of the Second Intifada (2000-2005).
11
 The Vision 
Documents are a set of three separate, seminal and unique documents that were published in 
2006 and 2007 by Arab civil society organizations in Israel on their view of the future of the 
state of Israel. The Vision Documents constitute the first time the Palestinian Arab minority 
                                                          
8
 Paul Roe. Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) 57. 
9
 See Paul Roe. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?” Journal of Peace Research. 
1999. Vol.36(2): 199,200 
10
 The Vision Documents:  
- The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. (The National Committee for the Heads of the 
Arab Local Authorities in Israel: Nazareth, 2006.) 
- The Haifa Declaration. (Mada al-Carmel – Arab Center for Applied Social Research: Haifa, 2007) 
- The Democratic Constitution. (Adalah - the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel: Shafa’amr, 
2007) 
11
 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2003) 170 
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have expressed their view of the future of the Israeli state collectively and are therefore 
treated as tangible markers of the action-reaction process.  
 
A Review of the Societal Security Dilemma 
With the end of the Cold War and the unexpected rise of ethnic violence that followed in the 
1990s new scholarly perspectives and theories on ethnic conflict and security began to 
emerge.
12
 These new perspectives were mostly geared towards explaining intrastate ethnic 
violence. Essentially this represents a shift in analytical focus with regard to security. During 
the Cold War security was primarily interpreted in military terms, the sole actors within 
international society were considered to be states, and the primary level of analyses were 
interstate relations in which the condition of these relations served as the main indicator of the 
level of security or insecurity of a given state.
13
 The new perspectives on security on the other 
side provide a more holistic approach to security in which the definition of security is 
broadened to entail any real or perceived danger to the maintenance, construction, or both of a 
specific collective, most often ethnic, identity. Two new security dilemmas were introduced in 
the 1990s: the ethnic security dilemma and the societal security dilemma.  
The ethnic security dilemma was first introduced by Barry Posen in his 1993 article 
“The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” This article aimed to explain the outbreak of 
ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats in former Yugoslavia as well as the lack of such 
violence in the case of Russia and Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union.
14
 Posen applies 
“a basic concept from the realist tradition of international relations theory, ‘the security 
dilemma’, to the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find 
themselves newly responsible for their own security.”15 Such a situation, according to Posen, 
arises when a multi-ethnic empire, such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, collapses as a 
                                                          
12
 Among Others See:   
- Barry R. Posen. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival. 1993. Volume 35(1): 27 
- Kenneth D. Bush and E. Fuat Keyman. “Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold 
War World.” 1997. Global Governance. Vol.3: 312 -316. 
- Paul Roe. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?” Journal of Peace 
Research. 1999. Vol.36(2): 188-189. 
- Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Klestrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe. (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 
- William Rose. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses.” Security Studies. 
2000. Vol. 9(4): 1-51. 
13
 Bush and Keyman. “Identity-Based Conflict.” 312. 
14
 Posen. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” 27-47. 
15
 Posen. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” 27. 
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consequence of which a state of anarchy is caused by the absence of a sovereign. Once in a 
state of anarchy, it is assumed by Posen’s realist theory, the different ethnic groups in a region 
will be primarily concerned with their security and thus must assess whether their neighbors 
are a threat or not. For Posen these threats are still labeled military capacity. However, 
according to Posen the military capacity of an ethnic group, as assessed by its rivals, will 
often rather be dependent on their cohesion as a group, the strength of their group identity, 
than on their actual military assets.
16
 Additionally the emotional power derived from the 
cohesion of a group can be seen as a powerful independent threat.
17
 In this process of threat 
assessment the histories of both ethnic groups play an important role. Although Posen’s 
adaptation of the security dilemma into an ethnic security dilemma is highly innovative, it 
does not go very far beyond the traditional security dilemma as it still assumes a natural state 
of anarchy, still speaks about military capacity, and although Posen does touch upon the vital 
importance of shared group history he does not link shared history to identity.  Furthermore, 
Posen does not consider if and how identities can be challenged or provoked in non-military 
or non-violent ways. Other realist scholars who have deployed the ethnic security dilemma, 
such as William Rose
18
 or Allan Collins
19
 show a similar preoccupation with predicting the 
likelihood of the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict and military capacity.      
The societal security dilemma on the other hand shifts in focus from the realist 
perspective to a more constructivist approach. Kenneth Bush and Fuat Keyman argue that 
“[…] the search for an effective response to identity-based conflicts requires more than the 
current [1997] mainstream (read: realist) efforts to fit them into the existing approaches to 
security.” 20  Furthermore, they argue “[...] that a relational, historical and dynamic 
understanding of identity is crucial not only for coming to terms with the connections between 
security and (ethnic) identity but also for constructing effective strategies for the management 
or resolution of conflict.”21  The societal security dilemma was first introduced by Barry 
Buzan in his book Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.
22
 Buzan had 
already coined the term societal security as a dimension of state security in his earlier study 
                                                          
16
 Posen. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” 31. 
17
 Ibidem.  
18
 For Example See: Rose. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” 1-51. 
19
 For Example See: Alan Collins. “The Ethnic Security Dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia.” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. 1998. Vol. 20(3): 261-278. 
20
 Bush and Keyman. “Identity-Based Conflict.” 311. 
21
 Ibidem. 
22
 Barry Buzan. “Societal Security, State Security, and Internationalisation.” In: Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe. (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 41-58 
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People, States and Fear.
23
 “Societal security was one of five sectors of security, the others 
being: military, political, economic and environmental.”24 In Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe societal security, though remaining a sector of state security, was 
reworked as a referent object of security by Ole Waever. Societal security in this case refers to 
the survival of a society which is dependent on the maintenance of its particular identity under 
changing conditions. Societal security “[…] is about the sustainability, within acceptable 
conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture association, and religious 
and national identity and custom.”25 However, there have been criticisms, most importantly 
by Bill McSweeney, that identities are not static and fixed but fluid and the result of historic 
processes.
26
 In a reply to McSweeney Buzan and his colleague Weaver argue that identities 
are indeed socially constructed but that once an identity has become socially sedimented it 
can become a referent object for security.
27
 
 
To take identity as a possible object of securitization, one has only to assume that it 
has a form which makes security discourse possible (i.e. it has a claim to survival as 
well as a clear image of what non-survival would mean). Usually this demands that the 
referent has become relatively stabilized in social practice.
28
   
 
Although Buzan introduced the societal security dilemma he never elaborated it into a 
workable theory. The societal security dilemma, however, was picked up by Paul Roe who 
worked the concept of societal security into the framework of the security dilemma in his 
book Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. Firstly, Roe distinguishes between a 
tight security dilemma, a regular security dilemma and a loose security dilemma. In a tight 
security dilemma two actors, or two societies in our case, with compatible security 
requirements misperceive each other’s intentions and thus are caught in a security dilemma 
despite the fact that both actors are security-seekers. A tight security dilemma may be 
mitigated if both sides realize their misperception. A regular security dilemma takes place 
                                                          
23
 Barry Buzan. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era. 
2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
24
 Roe. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma.”192. 
25
 Ole Waever. “Societal Security: The Concept.” In: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. 
(London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 23. 
26
 See: Bill McSweeney. “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School.” Review of International 
Studies. 1996. Vol.22: 81-93. 
27
 Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. “Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School 
Replies.” Review of International Studies. 1997. Vol.23: 241-250. 
28
 Buzan and Waever. “Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable?” 243. 
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when both actors indeed have incompatible security requirements but are also both security-
seekers. An additional distinction is made between expansionist and non-expansionist 
security-seekers. Lastly, a loose security dilemma occurs when one of the actors is not a 
security-seeker but a power-seeker and they are rather interested in expanding and dominating 
the other actor than in obtaining security. According to Roe societal security requirements are 
more contextual than their traditional security dilemma counterparts and depend wholly on 
what is important for maintaining a certain identity.
 29
  
 
From the perspective of minorities, the maintenance of identity is often tied to control 
over those institutions responsible for cultural reproduction, and/or over territory to 
which societal identity is bound. For the majority group, societal security is usually 
achieved through the preservation of its privileged (political) status and the 
maintenance of ‘national unity.’30   
 
The action-reaction process of the societal security dilemma, according to Roe, can best be 
conceived in terms of escalating nationalisms due to the fact that threats to societal security 
requirements often result in measures aimed at strengthening internal cohesion which often 
requires comparison with others.
31
  
 
Societal security dilemmas occur when the actions that groups take to secure their 
identity cause reactions in others, which, in the end, leave all parties less secure. 
Societies may try to strengthen group identity through cultural- and/or ethnic-
nationalist projects. The assumption of a worst-case scenario provokes a series of 
measures and counter-measures in which attempts to deny/revoke cultural rights are 
both implemented and resisted.
32
  
 
Violent conflict is not necessarily the outcome of an intra-state societal security dilemma for 
Roe. “At the intrastate level, harm can precede violence: violence may come later if either 
side cannot achieve their societal security requirements through political-legal means.”33  
Political-legal means thus constitute tangible markers to negate or fulfill societal security 
                                                          
29
 Roe. Ethnic Violence. 72. 
30
 Ibidem. 
31
 Roe. Ethnic Violence. 69. 
32
 Roe. Ethnic Violence. 73. 
33
 Roe. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma.” 200. 
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requirements and additionally allow to measure whether firstly there are perceived threats and 
secondly whether and how societal security requirements are being mitigated. Along the lines 
of Ronnie Olesker’s research into the societal security dilemma, “[…] rhetoric alone may not 
amount to a threat to social identity but bureaucratic and legal actions that are aimed at 
curtailing the ability of society to express and reproduce its identity certainly do.”34   
Most of the scholarship concerned with the societal and ethnic security dilemmas 
focuses on ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe among whom the above mentioned Roe and 
Posen. There are also some scholars concerned with South East Asia, such as Alan Collins.
35
 
With regard to Israel Hillel Frisch has addressed the relationship between security, ethnicity 
and the treatment of Israel’s Arab citizens. Frisch, who investigates the majority-minority 
relations in Israel overtime starting in 1948, argues that  
 
the relationship between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens is heavily influenced 
by the broader regional geo-strategic security situation facing the state […].Israeli 
policies toward its Arab citizens moderated during the rare periods of relative geo-
strategic security and hardened when Israel’s regional position became more 
precarious.
36
  
 
The societal security dilemma has thus far, however, only been utilized to explain ethnic 
tensions in Israel by Ronnie Olesker in her article Israel’s Societal Security Dilemma and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Olesker argues that the Jewish and Arab Israelis are locked 
into a regular societal security dilemma with incompatible societal security requirements. She 
questions specifically whether minority societal security requirements can be met at all in the 
Jewish-Israeli state although she only examines the threats that are perceived by the Jewish 
majority. Moreover, the focus of her article lies with the role of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process within the societal security dilemma which she views as exacerbating the societal 
security dilemma within Israel because Israel’s Palestinian Arab citizens are not in any way 
partners to it. Although parts of Olesker’s article are convincing the one sided attention for the 
societal security requirements of the Jewish majority weaken her argument. Furthermore the 
direct relevance of the role of the peace process within the societal security dilemma is 
                                                          
34
 Ronnie Olesker. “Israel’s Societal Security Dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics. 2011. Vol.17: 393. 
35
 Collins. “The Ethnic Security Dilemma.” 261-278. 
36
 Hillel Frisch. Israel’s Security and Its Arab Citizens. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 179. 
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questionable as Olesker identifies the possible resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
both as a possible solution to the present societal security dilemma and as a possible cause of 
escalation of the societal security dilemma. Most importantly, Olesker misses the expansionist 
security-seeking elements present in Jewish-Israeli political-legal measures and concludes that 
the Jewish majority are non-expansionist security-seekers. 
 
A Short History and Overview of the Composition of Israel’s Population  
The Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel share a long and rather complicated history with each 
other which started during the period of mandate Palestine and is situated within the 
framework of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. A pivotal moment in their history was the 
establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, and the first Arab-Israeli War (May 15, 
1948 - March 10, 1949) that followed it. Originally United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 181 had dictated that mandate Palestine would be partitioned into a Jewish state 
and an Arab state but at the end of the first Arab-Israeli War
37
 the newly created Israelis held 
“in all 8.000 square miles of Palestine, in contrast to the 6.200 square miles awarded to them 
in the UN partition plan.”38 Moreover, notwithstanding that between 800.000 and 900.000 
Palestinian-Arab inhabitants fled the area during the first Arab-Israeli war
39
 some 160.000 of 
them remained within the post-1949 borders of the Israeli state.
40
  
The ideology of Zionism,
41
 which is most succinctly described as Jewish nationalism, 
upon which the state of Israel was founded and which legitimated the Jewish nature of the 
Israeli state “had not envisaged the existence of a large, non-Jewish minority population in the 
future Jewish state […].”42 Therefore “areas of Arab concentration were placed under the 
                                                          
37
 The First Arab-Israeli War is known by the Jewish-Israelis as Milkhemet Ha'Atzma'ut, The War of 
Independence, whilst by the Arab Palestinians it is known as al-Nakba, The Catastrophe or just The Nakba.  
38
 Robert M. Seltzer. “The Onslaught of Modernity: Jewish History from 1880 to the Present.”  In: Jewish 
People, Jewish Thought: The Jewish Experience in History. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980) 675 
39
 “Historical Survey of Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to Secure the 
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III).” October 2, 1961. On: 
www.unispal.org. Last Accessed July 8, 2015.  
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3E61557F8DE6781A052565910073E819  
40
 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton. “Israel and the Palestinians from 1948 to the 1970’s.” In: A History 
of the Modern Middle East.(Boulder: Westview Press, 2009) 349. 
41
 For an overview of the development and history of Zionism see:   
- Seltzer. “The Onslaught of Modernity.” 626- 683. 
- Seltzer. “Secular Jewish Thought in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” 684-719. 
42
 Cleveland and Bunton. “Israel and the Palestinians.” 349 
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authority of a Military Administration”43 from 1949 until 1966.  In spite of this the Knesset 
passed the so-called Nationality Law in 1952. This law granted Israeli citizenship to most of 
the 160.000 Palestinian-Arab inhabitants of Israel.
44
 Those Palestinians who had fled during 
the war were not allowed to return to what was now the state of Israel and became refugees. 
mostly in the states surrounding Israel. Today there are an estimated 7.1 million displaced 
Palestinians worldwide.
45
 
The Third Arab-Israeli War
46
 which took place between June 5, 1967, and June 10, 
1967, is another key moment. During this short war Israel captured the West Bank as well as 
East Jerusalem from Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip were taken from Egypt 
and the Golan Heights from Syria. Estimates by the United Nations provide that an additional 
100.000 to 300.000 Palestinian-Arabs became displaced as a result of this war.
47
  The West 
Bank, which was estimated to still have 596.000 Palestinian-Arab inhabitants after the 1967 
war, and the Gaza Strip, which was assessed to still have 350.000 Palestinian-Arab 
inhabitants, became what we now know as the Occupied Territories and none of its 
inhabitants received Israeli citizenship.
48
 The Golan Heights was under a Military 
Administration until 1981 when the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Law which effectively 
annexed the region to the state of Israel and was accompanied by an offer of citizenship to the 
Arab inhabitants of the region although many rejected Israeli citizenship
49
 East Jerusalem was 
also annexed but its inhabitants received a permanent residence permit rather than Israeli 
citizenship.
50
  
As a consequence of Israel’s history its population today comprises a sizable Arab 
minority.  Data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel in April 2015 show that 
                                                          
43
 Cleveland and Bunton. “Israel and the Palestinians.” 349. 
44
 Nationality Law 1952. On: www.israellawresourcecenter.org. Last Accessed July 8, 2015.  
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/nationalitylaw.htm  
45
 “Palestinian Refugee Factbox/Timeline.” June 22, 2010. On: www.unispal.org. Last Accessed July 8, 2015.  
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/CD80C5D2CD1295118525774A0050DE74 
46
 The Third Arab-Israeli War is also known as the June War and The Six-Day-War. By the Jewish-Israelis it is 
known as Milhemet Sheshet Ha Yamim, The Six-Day War, whilst by the Arabs it is known as an-Naksah, The 
Setback.  
47
 “Palestinian Refugee Factbox/Timeline.”  
48
 Cleveland and Bunton. “Israel and the Palestinians.” 363. 
49
 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website. “GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW, December 14, 1981.” On: 
www.mfa.gov.il. Last Accessed July 8,2015. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/golan%20heights%20law.aspx  
50
 Usama Halabi. “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Legal practices to strengthen Jerusalem’s 
Jewish community and weaken that of the Palestinians.” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and 
Culture. 1997. Vol. 4(1). On: http://www.pij.org  
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Israel’s more than 8.3 million citizens 51  are currently made up of 6.251 million Jewish 
citizens, 74.9% of the total population, and 1.730 million Arab citizens, 20.7% of the total 
population. 364.000 citizens fall under the category of other and constitute the remaining 4.4% 
of the population.
52
 Data provided by the World Bank state that the joined populations of the 
West Bank and Gaza were measured to comprise 4.170 million people in 2013.
53
 The Arab 
citizens of Israel do not necessarily make up one homogeneous minority group as there is a 
religious and cultural diversity present among them. The Arab minority encompasses Muslim, 
Druze, Bahai, Bedouin, Circassian and Christian communities of different denominations.
54
 
Nevertheless what these communities all share with each other is a broader ethnic Arab as 
well as a Palestinian identity. In a similar manner the Jewish citizens of Israel also do not 
necessarily make up one cultural homogeneous majority group as they are an immigrant 
society consisting of Jewish people from all over the world. However, the Israeli nationality 
and Jewish ethnicity bond them together as a group. Both the majority and the minority group 
identities have been relatively sedimented in social practice.   
 
The Israeli State and Majority Societal Security Requirements  
Since the establishment of the state of Israel the Jewish-Israeli majority can be said to be in 
control of the state and its institutions. This has provided the majority with the opportunity to 
safeguard their societal security requirements through the mechanisms of the state in the 
shape of political-legal measures and policies from 1948 onwards. Moreover this also enabled 
them to strengthen their group identity through ethnic-nationalist projects. Majority societal 
security is most often achieved through the preservation of both privileged majority status and 
national unity.
55
 Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the broader regional 
Israeli-Arab Conflict the Jewish majority in Israel has perceived the Arab citizens of Israel as 
an extension of the enemy and as such as a threat to the survival of the Jewish state, the 
Jewish-Israeli identity and their majority status. This chapter will attend to the perceived 
threats to the Israeli Jewish majority identity as well as the reaction to these threats in the 
form of political-legal measures and policies. For matters of space only the more profound 
                                                          
51
 Concrete and verified data on the current amount of non-citizen inhabitants of  Israel are unavailable.  
52
 “67th Independence Day - 8.3 Million Residents in the State of Israel.”  
53
 World Bank Official Website. “Data West Bank and Gaza.” On: www.data.worldbank.org. Last Accessed July 
8, 2015.http://data.worldbank.org/country/west-bank-gaza  
54
 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website. On: www.mfa.gov.il.  Last Accessed May 26, 
2015.http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/people/pages/society-%20minority%20communities.aspx  
55
 Paul Roe. Ethnic Violence. 72. 
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and long lasting measures with which the Arab citizens of Israel have been confronted will be 
examined. These measures are Judaization of the land, treating the Arabs along sectarian lines 
in order to prevent them to identify as a collective, laws restricting reunifications with 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, state control in the areas of education, language, 
culture and religion and limitations to political participation.  
As stated earlier for identity to become a referent object of security it has to have a 
claim to survival as well as a clear image of what non-survival would mean.
56
 In the case of 
the Jewish majority in Israel these requirements are not only closely linked to the survival of 
the Israeli state but also to the survival of its Jewish character. Shafir and Peled, for example, 
write that “[…] the option of separating state and religion was rarely raised, because it would 
have meant doing away with Israel’s character as a Jewish state and would have threatened 
most Jews’ conception of their identity.”57 As such the survival of the Jewish character of the 
state can be seen to constitute the main societal security requirement of the Jewish majority. 
From the perspective of that Jewish majority Israel’s Arab citizens constitute two imminent 
threats to the maintenance of Jewish societal security. Firstly there is the issue of external 
security challenges and the discourse of identifying Israel’s Arab citizens with the enemy. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the broader Israeli-Arab conflict has elicited this 
discourse. According to Hillel Frisch “[s]ubjective feelings of insecurity in the early years of 
the state influenced official attitudes toward Israel’s Arab population […], perceptions that 
Israel’s Arab minority could serve as a potential fifth column were especially widespread 
among Israel’s political elite in the early years of the state.”58  This is part of the reason why 
in the beginning years of the Israeli state there was a military rule over Israel’s Arab citizens. 
Throughout the years, however, the continued identification of Israel’s Arab citizens with the 
enemy has also resulted in laws and policies that limited the possibilities of Israel’s Arab 
citizens to express and reproduce their collective Arab identity. Instead Israeli laws and 
policies aimed to instill an Israeli-Arab civic identity. Secondly there is the demographic 
factor which is also closely related to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and can be seen as an 
extension of the discourse of identifying Arab citizens with the enemy. As mentioned earlier 
of the total of 8.3 million citizens within the borders of Israel 6.251 million are Jewish 
citizens (74.9%) and 1.730 million are Arab citizens (20.7%).
59
 However, if the residents of 
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the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza
60
 are also taken into account there are 5.9 
million Palestinian-Arabs altogether within the state of Israel and the Occupied Territories. In 
this sense the Jewish citizens of Israel are just a slight majority; this heightens their sense of 
insecurity as well as the need to strengthen the Jewish majority identity.
61
  
Since the establishment of the Israel until today the Israeli government has undertaken 
what has been called the Judaization of the country, a process which alongside the 
appropriation of lands aimed to turn Israel into a Jewish space and to strengthen the collective 
national identity if the Jewish majority. The Judaization of the land entailed […] the massive 
nationalization and Judaization of land; […] the creation of powerful centralized controls over 
this national land by state and Jewish institutions such as the Jewish National Fund; and […]a 
selective distribution of limited property rights within the Jewish population.” 62 This 
nationalized land was taken from its previous Arab owners under a range of legal measures 
and although it is legally allowed to lease state-owned lands to non-Jewish citizens on the 
short-term, one to three years, this rarely happens and long-term leases which span forty-nine 
years are only legally available to Jewish citizens.
63
 This has had profound consequences for 
the economic opportunities of the Arab population. From the 1990s onwards the process of 
Judaization of the country started to take a different shape due to the adaptation of economic 
liberalism in Israel. Judaization of the land is now mostly practiced through private ownership 
of land rather than state ownership but the basics of the process have remained more or less 
the same.
64
 
 Alongside the Judaization process multiple policies and laws have been implemented 
in order to prevent the Arab citizens of Israel from unifying as a collective or identifying 
themselves with the Palestinian people outside of Israel. One of the policies has been to treat 
the Arab minority along the lines of the religious sects they belong to. This becomes most 
evident from the military draft which is compulsory for all Jewish citizens, although refusal to 
serve is accepted upon religious grounds. However, “[t]he only Arabic-speaking citizens who 
serve on a compulsory male basis are Druze and Circassians, although some Bedouin and 
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Christian Arabs volunteer.”65 Muslim Arabs can also serve on a voluntary basis. However, an 
article by the Jerusalem Post provided that in the year 2012 only 400 Arab citizens of Israel 
served in the Israeli Defense Forces voluntarily.
66
 Another way to prevent the Palestinian-
Arab citizens of Israel from reconnecting with their kin outside Israel has been to exclude 
them from the Law of Return (1950) and more recently through the Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel Law which is a customization of the 1952 Nationality Law and was passed in 2003. 
This Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law prevents any kind of family reunification between 
an Arab citizen of Israel and their non-citizen spouses or children, in other words it has 
become impossible for Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza to be reunited with family in 
Israel.
67
  
In the areas of education, language, culture and religion there are also several policies 
geared towards preventing the crystallization of a collective Palestinian-Arab identity in Israel. 
Due to the fact that Israel’s Arab citizens are identified by the state as the enemy, several 
limits are imposed through the Israeli educational system. The State Education Law of 1953 
dictates that all education should be based in Jewish cultural values and science, but also on 
love of the homeland and loyalty to the state and the Jewish people.
68
 This educational law is 
still upheld today and has served to develop a curriculum for Arab schools in which it is 
attempted to forge an Israeli-Arab identity in relation to the state. After the first Intifada 
(1987-1991) when institutions of higher education in the West Bank and Gaza “were a 
breeding ground for promoting Palestinian national identity and political organization,”69 staff 
for Arab schools were additionally subjected to security checks. For the same reasons requests 
for the foundation of an Arab University in Israel have been rejected.
70
 In the area of language, 
the linguistic influence of the Hebrew language has been vast. Although Arabic is officially 
also a language of the state it has little prominence and the state does not utilize Arabic much 
unless when forced to do so. Additionally, because Arabic has never been a required language 
in Jewish schools it is not possible to utilize Arabic in the Knesset as well as in other national 
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institutions.
71
 Furthermore, there is no institutional autonomy in the areas of culture and 
religion and the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs is, for example, in charge of the religious 
sites within the country.  
With regard to the political participation of the Arab citizens of Israel within Israeli 
national politics a barrier has been implemented in the form of the 1985 amendment to article 
7 of the Basic Law: The Knesset. Israel does not have a constitution but instead opted to draft 
the constitution as individual chapters called Basic Laws which altogether eventually were 
supposed to make up the constitution. Until this day no formal constitution has been adopted. 
Article 7 of the Basic Law: The Knesset attends to the criteria of disqualification of candidate 
lists from elections to the Knesset. The amendment states that  
 
A candidates list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset, and a person shall not 
be a candidate for election to the Knesset, if the goals or actions of the list or the 
actions of the person, expressly or by implication, include one of the following:  
(1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state;  
(2) incitement to racism; (3) support for armed struggle by a hostile state or a terrorist 
organization against the State of Israel.
72
  
 
This amendment effectively prohibits any Arab candidates list to address the exclusive Jewish 
character of the Israeli state or to publicly sympathize or identify themselves with the 
Palestinian people in Gaza or the West Bank hence limiting political participation of Israel’s 
Arab citizens.  
In conclusion, as a reaction to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the broader Arab-
Israeli Conflict the Israeli Jewish majority has perceived Israel’s Palestinian-Arab citizens as 
a threat to their survival from the very beginning of the existence of the Israeli state. The 
demographic factor has heightened the sense of insecurity amongst the Jewish majority. 
Central to the societal security of the Jewish majority is the Jewish character of the Israeli 
state. The societal security requirements of the Jewish majority are in accordance with Paul 
Roe’s claim that majority societal security is usually achieved through the maintenance of the 
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privileged majority status and national unity.
73
 The Jewish majority status is maintained 
through the process of Judaization of the land, limiting the possibilities for Arab political 
participation, and the policy of attending to the Arab minority as separate religious sects. 
National unity is safeguarded through Israeli state control over the institutions that are 
responsible for the maintenance and reproduction of the collective identity of Israel’s Arab 
Palestinian-Arab citizens in the areas of education, language, religion and culture. This state 
control gives the Israeli government the opportunity to instill an Israeli-Arab civic identity  
and prevent the emergence of Palestinian-Arab nationalism. Additionally freedom of 
movement of Israel’s Palestinian-Arab citizens is also limited towards this end. All these 
political-legal measures serve a dual purpose, on the one side they serve to weaken the 
Palestinian-Arab identity of the minority and on the other side they serve to strengthen the 
Jewish identity of the majority as well as the Jewish identity of the Israeli state. The Jewish 
majority thus demonstrates security-seeking behavior. Furthermore, the Jewish majority 
exhibits expansionist security-seeking behavior because the process of Judaization of the land 
literally turns Arab spaces into Jewish spaces.  
 
The Vision Documents and Minority Societal Security Requirements 
Israel’s Arab minority, as expounded in the previous chapter, has been subjected to a 
multiplicity of measures geared towards preventing the crystallization of their collective 
identity as Arabs and Palestinians throughout the existence of the Israeli state. In essence this 
has prevented the minority from safeguarding their societal security requirements. Therefore, 
“[…] since it is part of the political fabric of the state, and because it is excluded from 
legitimate political discourse, the Palestinian minority is forced to express its demands by 
means that do not put its status at risk.”74 The Vision Documents constitute this safe way for 
the Arab minority in Israel to express their societal security requirements. As argued by Roe, 
minority societal security requirements are oftentimes connected to control over the territory 
to which a specific societal identity is linked, institutions that are responsible for the 
reproduction of culture, or both.
75
 Within the context of the Israeli state and the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict in which the Israeli state is involved Israel’s Arab minority has perceived 
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the Jewish nature of the Israeli state and the machinery of Israel’s government as the main 
threat to the survival of their collective identity as Palestinian-Arabs. After an introduction to 
the Vision Documents and a brief examination of the development of Arab society in Israel 
this chapter will attend to the societal security requirements of Israel’s Arab minority as they 
are expressed in the Vision Documents. These societal security requirements, which are most 
often reactions to Israeli policies and laws, are related to the Jewish nature of the Israeli state, 
recognition of collective minority rights, the right to self-determination, educational, cultural 
and religious autonomy and lastly political participation. 
The Vision Documents, as they are collectively known, consist of three influential 
documents that were published independently from each other by three different Arab civil 
society organizations in Israel in 2006 and 2007.
76
 The first document that was published is 
The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel which appeared in 2006. It was written 
by the National Committee for the Heads of the Local Arab Councils in Israel and the High 
Follow-Up Committee for Arab citizens of Israel. The National Committee for the Heads of 
the Local Arab Councils in Israel is the national consultative body for the heads of the local 
Arab councils. The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab citizens of Israel, which was 
founded in 1982, is an independent political organization that aims to centralize and 
coordinate the political actions of all organizations of Arab citizens in Israel.
77
 The committee 
consists of Arab members of parliament, heads of the Arab local councils and representatives 
of the different religious movements in the Arab sector within Israel.
78
 Another collective 
future vision for the Arab citizens of Israel, The Haifa Declaration, was published in 2007. 
This document was written by “a group of Palestinian intellectuals, academics, and activists 
from different fields and political viewpoints” 79  for Mada al-Carmel - Arab Center for 
Applied Social Research which is located in the city of Haifa. Mada al-Carmel was founded 
in 2000 and its primary mission is to generate and provide  “information, critical analysis, and 
diverse perspectives on the social and political life and history of Palestinians, with particular 
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attention to Palestinians within Israel's 1948 boundaries.”80 The third document titled The 
Democratic Constitution also appeared in 2007 and was published by Adalah, The Legal 
Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Adalah, which was established in 1996, is an 
independent human rights organization and legal center that “works to promote and defend 
the rights of Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel”81 and “seeks to achieve equal individual and 
collective rights for [them].”82The Democratic Constitution was written by Adalah’s staff in 
collaboration with their colleagues both in Israel and abroad.  
 The Vision Documents constitute the first time that Israel’s Arab citizens expressed 
their own view of the future of the Israeli state. According to Jamal the Vision Documents are 
an expression of the increasing general will that strives for more homogeneity amongst all of 
the different groups belonging to the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel.
83
 The reason such an 
expression took more than fifty years to emerge is that the Palestinian-Arab society that had 
been present in mandate Palestine was destroyed during the first Arab Israeli War and had to 
be rebuilt afterwards. This, however, was seriously complicated by the fact that they were 
disorganized, dispossessed and leaderless after the war, were a heterogeneous group and in 
addition faced the restricting measures of the Israeli government.
84
 As Kimmerling and 
Migdal state it was only  “[a]fter the 1967 war, when the three fragments of historical 
Palestine – Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank – were rejoined under Israeli control, 
many Arab citizens of Israel could again begin to define themselves as part of the larger 
Palestinian community.”85 Furthermore, as the same authors argue, the political emergence of 
Israel’s Arab citizens only took off in the second half of the 1970s.  
 
Their political emergence was framed by three violent, momentous events: Land Day 
in 1976, the outbreak of the Intifada [1987-1991] in the occupied territories in 1987, 
and the deadly clash with Israeli security forces in October 2000 after the start of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada [2000-2005] in the newly constituted Palestinian Authority.
86
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Notwithstanding that the three above mentioned events could also be treated as acts of 
resistance against the curtailment of a collective Palestinian-Arab identity Kimmerling and 
Migdal’s analysis suggests that Arab society within Israel only fully politically emerged at the 
end of the Second, al-Aqsa, Intifada. This is supported by the work of Jamal who states that, 
“the mere idea of thinking about a future vision document that defines the identity of the 
Palestinian homeland minority and its values and goals reflects a maturity that did not exist 
before.”87 Moreover the fact that the organizations that have written and published the Vision 
Documents have only been established in the years 1982, 1996 and 2000 further supports this 
claim.   
The Vision Documents are part of the action-reaction process of the societal security 
dilemma in the sense that they address the status quo of the Israeli state and attend to the areas 
in which Israeli government law and policy has sought to restrict the emergence of a 
collective identity amongst its Arab citizens. All three documents connect the collective 
identity of Israel’s Arab citizens to the broader Palestinian nation as all of them speak in terms 
of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, the Palestinian minority or Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. 
“[T]he documents constitute an expression of the development of a distinctive collective 
political consciousness that does not separate itself from its mother nation, the Palestinian 
people, but nonetheless asserts its uniqueness and its special needs and interests.”88 The main 
societal security requirement presented in the Vision Documents is the demand that the Israeli 
state relinquishes its exclusive Jewish identity. As such the Vision Documents are not only a 
clear reaction to the status quo but also specifically aim to strengthen the collective identity of 
the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel and to weaken the Jewish identity of the Israeli state. In the 
introduction of The Future Vision this becomes evident from the following words:  
 
Defining the Israeli State as a Jewish state and exploiting democracy in the service of 
its Jewishness excludes us, and creates tension between us and the nature and essence 
of the State. Therefore, we call for a Consensual Democratic system that enables us to 
be fully active in the decision-making process and guarantee our individual and 
collective civil, historic, and national rights.
89
 
 
                                                          
87
 Jamal. Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel. 167. 
88
 Ibidem. 
89
 The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. 5. 
21 
 
Another central societal security requirement, which is closely related to the one mentioned 
above, is the demand that the Israeli state recognizes its Arab citizens as an innate national 
minority that has collective rights. The relationship the Arab citizens have with the historic 
homeland of Palestine plays an important role in this. The fundamental basis of all three 
Vision Documents is that the Arab citizens of Israel are a homeland, or indigenous, minority 
within Israel but are also part of the larger Palestinian nation and should be recognized as 
such. Such recognition would serve to strengthen their collective identity. Moreover, in light 
of human rights discourse and the right to self-determination this further supports the 
insistence that Israel should recognize its responsibility for the injustices of the Nakba and the 
Occupation as expressed in all the documents.  
The right to self-determination also constitutes a societal security requirement in itself. 
The Vision Documents speak explicitly against the attempts to forge a new Israeli-Arab 
identity as well as against its policy of treating the Arab population along the lines of the 
religious sects they belong to. For example, The Haifa Declaration states: “[…][D]espite all 
the attempts to splinter us into sectarian groups and to truncate our identity into a misshapen 
“Israeli-Arab” one, we have spared no effort to preserve our Palestinian identity and national 
dignity and to fortify it.”90 The Future Vision speaks about the attempt of Israel to create a 
new identity on the basis of “loyalty to the state” through the Arab educational curricula.91 
This is due to the fact that the Arab educational curriculum for public schools still upholds 
educational objectives that neglect Palestinian Arab culture, history and values and stresses 
Jewish culture, history and values as articulated in the 1953 Law of State Education.
 92
 For 
example, “general Arab history was taught and was presented as complementary to the history 
of the Israeli state and Zionism.”93 Another example provided by Abu-Saad is the 2004 “100 
Basic Concepts” curriculum unit which systematically presented all the concept lists for Arab 
schools as only relevant for the Arabic sector but simultaneously omitted all history of the 
Palestinian people.
94
  
From the right to self-determination follows the call for national institutional 
autonomy in the areas of education, culture and religion which constitute another societal 
security requirement. In The Future Vision the general demand for institutional autonomy is 
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justified as follows: “The relation with the “other”, the Israeli, does not present the relation 
with Jewish culture but the relation with the State and its Institutions. The State has not 
determined a position acceptable to us yet in terms of nurturing our Arab culture.”95 In the 
area of education this translates to an alternative to the above mentioned Arab educational 
curricula by the state which is “limiting contribution in enhancing the cultural identity.”96 
Instead The Future Vision poses that the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel have a right to self-
administration of the educational system and self-determination of its policy and should adopt 
the education objectives drafted by the Follow Up Committee for Arab Education in Israel in 
1994.
97
  
In the area of religious autonomy a similar argument is made for autonomous 
institutions for all the different religious groups amongst the Arab citizens of Israel. The 
Future Vision expresses that “Israel should no longer be in control of the Islamic and 
Christian holy sites and acknowledge their right of self-rule as part of the collective rights 
given to the Palestinian-Arabs.”98 In the area of cultural autonomy the inferior status of the 
Arabic language is an issue and there is a call for equality between the Hebrew language and 
the Arabic language. The Democratic Constitution does this through proposing a legal 
bilingual state in which both the languages “are the official languages of the state of Israel and 
enjoy equal status in all of the functions and activities of the legislative and executive 
branches.” 99  The authors of The Democratic Constitution base this proposal on their 
“perception of the essence of an imaginary federal regime.”100 In addition to educational, 
cultural and religious autonomy The Democratic Constitution proposes that “[e]very citizen is 
entitled to establish and maintain his or her family, social, cultural, religious and economic 
relations with members of his or her people or nation, including the right to freely cross 
borders to them.”101 
The last societal security requirement expressed in the Vision Documents lies in the 
area of political participation within the Israeli state. The possibility of political participation 
is related to, and dependent on, the demand that the Israeli state abandons its Jewish nature. 
The Vision Documents view this as a necessity in order to enable equal political access and 
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participation. The Haifa Declaration phrases it as follows:  “a change in the definition of the 
State of Israel from a Jewish state to a democratic state established on national and civil 
equality between the two national groups, and enshrining the principles of banning 
discrimination and of equality between all of its citizens and residents.”102 Furthermore, the 
Vision Documents advocate  “guaranteeing Palestinian citizens in Israel the right of veto in all 
matters that concern their status.”103  
In conclusion, the Vision Documents illustrate how the action-reaction process within 
the societal security dilemma between the Arab and Jewish societies in Israel takes place. The 
Vision Documents are a quite direct reaction to the political-legal measures discussed in the 
previous chapter which are perceived by the minority as threats to their collective Palestinian-
Arab identity. The societal security requirements that are presented in the Vision Documents 
are in line with what would be expected from minority societal security requirements: a 
measure of control over the territory to which the Palestinian-Arab identity of Israel’s Arab 
citizens is bound as well as control over the institutions that are responsible for the 
reproduction of that identity.
104
 The first is expressed through the demand that the Israeli state 
relinquishes its Jewish nature, acknowledges the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel as a homeland 
minority, the advancement of political participation and the insistence that all of Israel’s 
Palestinian-Arabs are to be able to travel freely to the Occupied Territories in order to 
maintain social, economic, religious and familial relations. The second is expressed through 
the demand that Israel’s Palestinian-Arabs receive institutional autonomy in the areas of 
religion, culture, and education as well as the demand for the elevation of the status of the 
Arabic language through the implementation of a legal bilingual state. Like the Jewish 
majority, the Palestinian-Arab minority demonstrates security-seeking behavior in order to 
safeguard their collective identity, or at least expresses the desire to do so, as the Vision 
Documents are only a recommendations. On the other side the minority is non-expansionist as 
it operates within the framework of the Israeli state and accepts its existence. The societal 
security requirements of the Palestinian-Arab minority, however, mitigate the societal security 
requirements of the Jewish majority meaning that the societal security requirements of the two 
groups are incompatible.  
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Conclusion 
The main research question of this thesis was whether a societal security dilemma can be 
identified within the state of Israel between the Jewish-Israeli society and the Palestinian-
Arab society in Israel and if so, what kind of security dilemma. “Societal security dilemmas 
occur when the actions that groups take to secure their identity cause reactions in others, 
which, in the end, leave all parties less secure.”105 The Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel find 
themselves within the action-reaction process of such a societal security dilemma. They are 
locked into a regular societal security dilemma with incompatible societal security 
requirements in which the Jewish society exhibits expansionist security-seeking behavior and 
the Arab society exhibits non-expansionist security-seeking behavior.  
Jewish-Israeli society, constituting the majority, has always perceived the Palestinian-
Arab citizens as a threat to the survival of the Jewish state as well as to the survival of the 
Jewish majority within the Israeli state. This threat perception is interconnected with, and 
dependent on, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Jewish-Israeli society therefore behaves as a 
security-seeker with regard to Israel’s Palestinian-Arab citizens and employs political-legal 
measures in order to prevent the emergence of a collective Palestinian-Arab identity amongst 
them. Instead they have attempted to impose a new, Israeli-Arab civic identity upon the 
Palestinian-Arab society present in Israel. The process of Judaization of the land with its 
features of land appropriation additionally constitutes expansionist behavior. The Jewish 
majority legitimately perceives threats to its collective identity, even if some of these threats 
are misperceived, and is therefore not merely a power-seeker which rules out the possibility of 
a loose societal security dilemma from the majority side of the dilemma. The possibility of a 
tight security dilemma is ruled out because the Jewish majority rightly perceived that Israel’s 
Arab citizens identify themselves as part of the Palestinian people first and as Israeli citizens 
second and that they disagree with the Jewish character of the Israeli state. Jewish-Israeli 
society is thus an expansionist security-seeker.  
The Palestinian-Arab society in Israel, although it took a long time to rebuild after the 
establishment of the Israeli state, in turn perceives the political-legal measures employed by 
Jewish-Israeli society as a threat to their  Palestinian-Arab identity. Lacking concrete political 
power within the Israeli state to influence these political-legal measures they employed the 
only legal means available to them within the structure of the Israeli state and presented their 
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societal security requirements in the Vision Documents. The Vision Documents plead for the 
official recognition of the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel as an indigenous minority in their 
historic homeland, minority control over all institutions relating to cultural reproduction and 
most importantly they plead for the relinquishment of the Jewish character of the Israeli state 
which would give them equal control over the territory to which their societal identity is 
bound. However, because the Vision Documents accept the existence of Israel and operate 
within the framework of the state they are not expansionist. For this same reason the 
Palestinian-Arab minority is also not a power-seeker and the possibility of a loose security 
dilemma is therefore also ruled out from the minority side of the dilemma. Due to the fact that 
there is no misperception about the intentions of the Jewish majority to curtail  the collective 
Palestinian-Arab identity a tight societal security dilemma is out of the question. Palestinian-
Arab society within Israel is thus a non-expansionist security-seeker.  
The basic assumption in this thesis was that the societal security dilemma holds an 
alternative and valuable approach to understanding the relationship between the Palestinian-
Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel and the dynamics of unequal citizenship. The analysis of 
the societal security dilemma offered in this thesis contributes to our understanding of the 
topic in several ways. Firstly, the societal security dilemma is valuable because it is not 
merely a tool to describe the behavior of different societies on the intrastate level but also 
offers an explanation of the motivations that inspire certain actions and reactions without 
having to label societies as racist or necessarily having to utilize international law discourses. 
Gaining insight in the motivations for the behavior of both the Jewish majority and the 
Palestinian-Arab minority helps to create a better and more holistic understanding of the 
situation in the state of Israel. Secondly, utilizing the societal security dilemma as a way to 
view the societies in Israel opens up the opportunity to constructively think about possible 
solutions that could reduce the tension between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian-Arab 
minority in the future. This could help to prevent the further escalation of the currently 
present societal security dilemma and the possible outbreak of violent conflict between the 
Jewish majority and the Palestinian-Arab minority in the future. However, this would require 
further research.  
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